
October 26, 1952

I

- 1. First Neck: We consult with Italian, Turkish and Grack Embassies here in support of Finletter consultation with TermReps in Paris about the multilateral Southern Conmand pilot sea-based HEBH Torce suggested in his POLTO 506. (Draft telegram attached.) In light of discussions with Ambassadors, a special emissary might be cant to Reme and Turkey.
 - 24 Current. At same time:

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- (a) US starts to work out timing and forum for bilateral US-Soviet negotiations with USSE, via U Thant. US
 makes clear that, if these negotiations do not result in early
 removal Soviet offensive weapons in Orba, it will take necessary
 military action.
- (b) US encourages interested countries in UN to plou chead with concept of Latin American and African nuclear-free acces.

II

- 3. Second Week. If consultation with Italians and Turks warrants, was
- (a) Suggest to Italian Covernment, via its Embassy hard and its Fernadop in Paris, that it respond to US Catober 22 presentation on multilateral force by proposing early formation of pilot unliffatoral sea-laced force in Southern Commund. Ith participation

participation by Turks, Greeks, Italians and two won-European auchers: US and Canada.

- (b) Suggest to Greek, Turkish, and Canadian governunta (via Pabassies here and FarmReps in Paris) that they be propared to respond affirmatively.
- (c) Suggest to Turbish and Italian governments that this will make it possible for them to get on record that we take to be their intent enjury, i.e., that they are prepared to phase cut IRDH's, in view of the prespective formation of a couchern force and the interim coverage provided by US Polaris and other external forces in the manutime, without this move seeming a response to Soviet pressure.

Assuming a favorable response to these auggestions, the play promptly unfolds in the NAC, and the US respects by incleating that it is prepared to join in southern multilatoral
pilot force, if countries concerned wish to proceed, and will
provide coverage with Polaris and other enternal forces in
usentime. Italian and Turkish Perahaps make known in course
of discussion their intent to phase cut IREM's, since they could
not afford both Scuthern Force and Until's, but those statements
one not used public at the time. (There has never yet been
an NAC lank.)

- 4. Current. At same time, UN-Seviet negotiations begin:
- (a) On Othe, we propose removal of Soviet offensive wapens, in return for and of US quarantine. This could be done in content of Intin American nuclear free zone, and proposals for such a zone whould represent the main initiative in looking to a solution of the crisis.
- (b) Ga comp control, we propose US-Seviet non-diffusion declarations, sefeguards against miscalculation (e.g., communication facilities between US and Seviet command conters), and US-Seviet declarations not to facilitate procurement of MRDH's for maticual lead deployment in NATO and fareau Fact commerces other than US and USSA (based on stated US policy only to facilitate MEDN procurement for multilateral sea-based force). If Seviets makes question of Italian and Turkish INDH's, we could decide at that time, in consultation with our allies, whether to make public the prior Italian and Turkish IRBH statements; if so, the US could formally declare its desire to respect these governments' stated intentions to phase out IRBH's, as part of the general declarations on MREM's referred to above.

INTE: The timing of all these moves would, of course, be intimately effected by consurrent Soviet diplomatic and other coulons.

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October 26, 1962

Τ

1. First Week: We consult with Italian, Turkish, and Greek Embassies here in support of Finletter consultation with PermReps in Paris about the multilateral Southern Command pilot sea-based MRBM force suggested in his POLTO 506. (Draft telegram attached.) In light of discussions with Ambassadors, a special emissary might be sent to Rome and Turkey.

2. Current. At same time:

- (a) US starts to work out timing and forum for bilateral US-Soviet negotations with USSR, via U Thant. US makes clear that, if those negotiations do not result in early removal Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, it will take necessary military action.
- (b) US encourages interested countries in UN to plow ahead with concept of Latin American and African nuclear-free zones.

ΙI

- 3. <u>Second Week</u>. If consultation with Italians and Turks warrants, we:
- (a) Suggest to Italian Government, via its Embassy
 here and its PermRep in Paris, that it respond to US October 22
 presentation on multilateral force by proposing early formation
 of pilot multilateral sea-based force in Southern Command, with
 participation

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participation by Turks, Greeks, Italians and two non-European members: US and Canada.

- (b) Suggest to Greek, Turkish, and Canadian governments (via Embassies here and PermReps in Paris) that they be prepared to respond affirmatively.
- (c) Suggest to Turkish and Italian governments that this will make it possible for them to get on record that we take to be their intent anyway, i.e., that they are prepared to phase out IRBM's, in view of the prospective formation of a southern force and the interim coverage provided by US Polaris and other external forces in the meantime, without this move seeming a response to Soviet pressure.

Assuming a favorable response to these suggestions, the play promptly unfolds in the NAC, and the US reponds by indicating that it is prepared to join in southern multilateral pilot force, if countries concerned wish to proceed, and will provide coverage with Polaris and other external forces in meantime. Italian and Turkish PermReps made known in course of discussion their intent to phase out IRBM's, since they could not afford both Southern Force and IRBM's, but these statements are not made public at the time. (There has never yet been an NAC leak.)

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- 4. Current. At the same time, US-Soviet negotiations begin:
- (a) On <u>Cuba</u>, we propose removal of Soviet offensive weapons, in return for end of US quarantine. This could be done in context of Latin American nuclear free zone, and proposals for such a zone should represent the main initiative in looking to a solution of the crisis.
- (b) On arms control, we propose US-Soviet non-diffusion declarations, safeguards against miscalculations (e.g., communication facilities between US and Soviet command centers), and US-Soviet declarations not to facilitate procurement of MRBM's for national land deployment in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries other than US and USSR (based on stated US policy only to facilitate MRBM procurement for multilateral sea-based force). If Soviets raise question of Italian and Turkish IRBM's, we could decide at that time, in consultation with our allies, whether to make public the prior Italian and Turkish IRBM statements; if so, the US could formally declare its desire to respect these governments' stated intentions to phase out IRBM's, as part of the general declarations on MRBM's referred to above.

NOTE: The timing of all these moves would, of course, be intimately affected by concurrent Soviet diplomatic and other actions.

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